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R v Bowler 
Richard Bowler (B) suffered from cerebral palsy and had a live-in carer, David Connor (C). The 
deĐeased, AluŶ Williaŵs ;WͿ, ǁas ͚iŶteƌested iŶ eǆtƌeŵe ŵasoĐhistiĐ seǆual eǆpeƌieŶĐes͛. B ŵet W 
after the latter advertised on a gay networking website using the Ŷaŵe ͚BoŶdage KeŶt͛, eǆpƌessiŶg 
his interest in mummification, in which a person was wrapped in cellophane or PVC or both. B and W 
engaged in sexual activity, during which the latter was wrapped in cellophaŶe, oŶ ͚aďout ϭϬ oƌ ϭϱ 
occasioŶs͛ at B͛s flat iŶ Doǀeƌ. OŶe eǀeŶiŶg iŶ August ϮϬϭϯ, W eŵailed B aŶd iŶǀited hiŵself to B͛s 
flat. W arrived at the flat at around 11.30 pm and went upstairs to the bedroom where B wrapped 
him in cellophane, leaving air holes to enable him to breathe. He then wrapped him in PVC, all done 
ǁith W͛s ĐoŶ-sent (even encouragement). There were no air holes in the PVC, but B said that he had 
wrapped it loosely enough to allow W to breathe. C helped with the PVC wrapping. B had sex with W 
and then left him. W had previously said he liked to ďe left ͚ŵuŵŵified͛ afteƌ seǆ aŶd theŶ to sleep. 
B checked on W about half an hour later when he was still moving. However, when B checked again 
later, W was lifeless. At that point, B and C panicked, and waited three hours before calling the 
emergency services. The post-mortem report indicated that suffocation was not the cause of death 
but did reveal that W had taken drugs, including ketamine and methamphetamine, before his death. 
Rather, the tight wrapping in cellophane and PVC, exacerbated by sexual activity and drug use, had 
iŶĐƌeased W͛s ďodǇ teŵpeƌatuƌe ǁhilst siŵultaŶeouslǇ pƌeǀeŶtiŶg the ďodǇ fƌoŵ ĐooliŶg itself ďǇ 
sweating, resulting in dehydration and lowering of the blood pressure and eventual heart failure. 
Both B and C were charged with manslaughter by gross negligence and appeared before HH Judge 
Williams and a jury at Canterbury Crown Court in December 2014. B was convicted and sentenced to 
fiǀe Ǉeaƌs͛ iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt; C ǁas aĐƋuitted. B appealed agaiŶst seŶteŶĐe. 
 
R v S 
In March 2014, S, on his 15th birthday, shot and killed his girlfriend, Shereka Marsh (M), also 15, at 
his ŵotheƌ͛s house iŶ Ŷoƌtheast LoŶdoŶ. S ǁas a ŵeŵďeƌ of a gaŶg, the BalaŶĐe BoǇs of HaĐkŶeǇ, 
aŶd had ďeeŶ giǀeŶ a ͚Biƌeǀetta͛ ϳ.ϲϱ ŵŵ self-loading pistol to look after by another gang member. 
S was showing off with the gun and pointed it at M and pulled the trigger, apparently to scare her. 
However, it fired and M was shot dead. The pathologist determined that when M was shot she was 
holding her left hand across her face as if to protect herself; the bullet passed through her wrist and 
entered her neck. S was charged with murder, with manslaughter by gross negligence as an 
alternative charge, and appeared before HH Judge Wide and a jury at the Central Criminal Court in 
September 2014. S said that he had removed the magazine from the handle of the gun but had not 
realised that there was a bullet in the chamber. He was acquitted of murder but convicted of 
manslaughter on the basis that he had failed to check sufficiently that the gun was not loaded. The 
judge imposed an extended sentence of 14 years (comprising a custodial element of 9 years and a 
four-year extension period). S appealed against both conviction and sentence. 
 
HELD, DISMISSING S͛S APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION BUT ALLOWING THE APPEALS AGAINST 
SENTENCE, both appellants had breached their duty of care to the deceased and in doing so had 
fallen so far below the standard of care to be expected of them that it amounted to gross 
negligence, causing death. In both cases the duty of care was said (either explicitly or implicitly) to 
be based on the fact that the appellants had created dangerous situations. According to Gilbart J in 
Bowler: 
[N]otwithstanding the fact that W was an enthusiastic participant in being wrapped in 
cellophane and PVC and being left thus, the fact is that he was left helpless and in a 
situation which was obviously dangerous. No doubt a man of firmer resolve than the 
appellant would not have panicked as he did, and not thereby made the situation worse. 
(at [20]; emphasis added) 
 
The court in S ǁas less eǆpliĐit, ďut CƌaŶstoŶ J said that ͚IŶ esseŶĐe, the pƌoseĐutioŶ Đase oŶ ĐouŶt Ϯ 
was that it amounted to gross negligence to point the gun and pull the trigger, without having 
eŶsuƌed that it ǁas safe to do so͛ ;at [ϭϬ]Ϳ. 
 
Both appellants had also demonstrated gross negligence sufficient to justify the imposition of 
criminal liability. In Bowler, the appeal Đouƌt aĐĐepted the tƌial judge͛s assessŵeŶt of the faĐts: 
 
[T]o leave W as he had was an act of gross negligence. He had gone downstairs and 
fallen asleep or just did not bother, and he had failed to monitor him or check him and 
that had led to his death ...[W]hen he got no response, his continuing delay was also 
reprehensible. (at [12]) 
 
In S, counsel for the appellant suggested that his conviction for gross negligence manslaughter was 
uŶsafe ďeĐause ͚theƌe ǁas ŶothiŶg that Đould giǀe ƌise to aŶ iŶfeƌeŶĐe of foƌeseeaďilitǇ͛; speĐifiĐallǇ 
͚theƌe ǁas Ŷo eǀideŶĐe fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh it Đould safelǇ ďe iŶfeƌƌed that he eitheƌ kŶeǁ oƌ ďelieǀed theƌe 
was a bullet in the Đhaŵďeƌ at the ĐƌuĐial tiŵe͛. The Couƌt of Appeal ƌejeĐted this argument. 
Cranston J justified upholding the guilty verdict as follows: 
 
In our judgment, the issue for the jury on count 2 was not based on a subjective test 
(what did the applicant know, believe or foresee) but rather an objective one: whether a 
reasonable and prudent person of the appliĐaŶt͛s age aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁould haǀe 
foƌeseeŶ a seƌious ƌisk of death aŶd, if so, ǁhetheƌ the appliĐaŶt͛s ĐoŶ-duct fell so far 
below the standard of care required that it was grossly negligent such that it constituted 
a crime. In answering that objective question, it was open to the jury to conclude on the 
eǀideŶĐe ďefoƌe it that the appliĐaŶt͛s ĐoŶduĐt fell ďeloǁ the staŶdaƌd of Đaƌe iŶ 
pointing a gun and pulling the trigger when just a short distance away from Shereka. (at 
[20]) 
 
Nevertheless, the sentence passed in each case was reduced. In the case of Bowler, the appropriate 
seŶteŶĐe ǁas thƌee Ǉeaƌs͛ iŵpƌisoŶŵeŶt. IŶ S͛s Đase, ͚theƌe ǁas the difficulty of basing a conclusion 
[that S met the criteria for an extended seŶteŶĐe] oŶ a ǀeƌdiĐt of gƌoss ŶegligeŶĐe ŵaŶslaughteƌ͛ ;at 
[ϯϳ]Ϳ. The authoƌ of S͛s pƌe-sentence report had not concluded that S posed a significant risk of 
serious harm to members of the public from the commission of further specified offences. An 
extended sentence could not be justified; a determinate seŶteŶĐe of ŶiŶe Ǉeaƌs͛ iŵpƌisonment was 
appropriate. 
 
Commentary 
Duty of Care 
These cases provide illustrations of the situations in which a duty of care for the purposes of 
manslaughter by gross negligence will be imposed if the accused creates a dangerous situation. The 
precedent for imposing a duty of care in such circumstances is R v Evans [2009] EWCA Crim 650, 
[2009] 1 WLR 1999, in which the accused, Gemma Evans (E), was charged with manslaughter by 
gross negligence following the death of her 16-year-old half-sister, Carly Townsend (T). E had 
procured heroin for T, who was a recovering drug addict. After T self-injected, she suffered an 
overdose but, rather than call for an ambulance, E and her mother Andrea Townsend (A) put T to 
bed hoping that she would sleep it off. Unfortunately, she was found dead in bed the next morning. 
Both A and E ǁeƌe ĐoŶǀiĐted of T͛s ŵaŶslaughter, the former on the basis of her parental duty and 
the latter on the basis that she was responsible for creating the situation in the first place. Upholding 
E͛s ĐoŶǀiĐtioŶ, Loƌd Judge CJ said: 
 
The duty necessary to found gross negligence manslaughter is plainly not confined to 
cases of a familial or professional relationship between the defendant and the 
deceased ...[F]or the purposes of gross negligence manslaughter, when a person has 
created or contributed to the creation of a state of affairs which he knows, or ought 
reasonably to know, has become life threatening, a consequent duty on him to act by 
taking reasoŶaďle steps to saǀe the otheƌ͛s life ǁill ŶoƌŵallǇ aƌise. ;at [ϯϭ]Ϳ 
 
Although not cited in either Bowler or S, it is clear that the duty of care, and hence convictions, in 
both cases can be supported on the basis of Evans. 
 
Gross Negligence 
CouŶsel foƌ the appellaŶt͛s aƌgument in S—that gross negligence requires subjective awareness of 
the risk of death—was correctly rejected. Although the appeal court did not cite any authority in 
support of its decision on this point, the case law has consistently emphasised that, in determining 
gross negligeŶĐe, ǁhat is ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt is the aĐĐused͛s ĐoŶduĐt, Ŷot his oƌ heƌ state of ŵiŶd. IŶ 
the leading case, R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171, Lord Mackay LC said: 
 
The jury will have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant’s conduct 
departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as it must 
have done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be judged criminal. (at 
p.187, emphasis added) 
 
This point was confirmed by Rose LJ in Attorney General’s Reference (No.2 of 1999) 
[2000] QB 796: 
 
Although theƌe ŵaǇ ďe Đases ǁheƌe the defeŶdaŶt͛s state of ŵiŶd is ƌeleǀaŶt to the 
juƌǇ͛s ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ ǁheŶ assessiŶg the gƌossŶess aŶd ĐƌiŵiŶalitǇ of his ĐoŶduĐt, 
evidence of his state of mind is not a prerequisite to a conviction for manslaughter by 
gross negligence. The Adomako test is objective. (at p.809, emphasis added) 
 
Unlawful Act Manslaughter as an Alternative? 
It is interesting that the prosecution in S pursued a manslaughter conviction via gross negligence 
rather than via an unlawful act, given that the facts would seem to support a conviction via that 
alternative route. The possibility that the same set of facts could support a verdict of manslaughter 
via either route is rarely explored but was explicitly accepted by the Court of Appeal in R v 
Willoughby [2004] EWCA Crim 3365; [2005] 1 WLR 1880. In that case, Rose LJ said: 
 
It is necessary to point out that, as a matter of law, the two categories of manslaughter, 
by an unlawful and dangerous act and by gross negligence, are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. In some circumstances a defendant may be guilty of the offence by both 
routes. (at [19]) 
 
As Treacy LJ explained in R v Bristow and Others [ϮϬϭϯ] EWCA Cƌiŵ ϭϱϰϬ, ͚The Đƌiŵe of uŶlaǁful aĐt 
manslaughter comprises (a) an unlawful act intentionally performed (b) in circumstances rendering it 
a daŶgeƌous aĐt ;ĐͿ ĐausiŶg death͛ ;at [ϯϮ]Ϳ. IŶ S, theƌe ǁas ǀeƌǇ stƌoŶg eǀideŶĐe that the aĐĐused 
had committed an assault on M, which is an unlawful act for the purposes of unlawful act 
manslaughter (R v Larkin [1943] KB 174; R v Pagett (1983) 76 Cr App R 279; R v Lewis [2010] EWCA 
Crim 151). 
 
The appeal Đouƌt iŶ S appeaƌed to aĐĐept as aĐĐuƌate the tƌial judge͛s ƌeŵaƌks duƌiŶg seŶteŶĐiŶg that 
the appellaŶt ͚poiŶted the guŶ at the deĐeased, aŶd pulled the tƌiggeƌ, iŶ oƌdeƌ to sĐaƌe heƌ͛ ;at 
[ϯϮ]Ϳ. The faĐt that M ǁas holdiŶg heƌ haŶd aĐƌoss heƌ faĐe ;iŶdiĐated iŶ the pathologist͛s ƌepoƌtͿ 
suggested that S͛s aĐtioŶs had ŵade heƌ appƌeheŶsiǀe of iŵŵediate uŶlaǁful foƌĐe, suffiĐient to 
fulfil the actus reus of assault; S͛s appaƌeŶt iŶteŶtioŶ to sĐaƌe heƌ fulfilled the mens rea. 
 
The presence of all of the elements of assault would therefore distinguish S from the superficially 
similar case of R v Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981. In that case, the appellant (L) shot and killed his friend and 
was convicted of manslaughter. However, unlike that of S, the conviction in Lamb was quashed on 
the basis that there was no unlawful act because there was neither the actus reus nor the mens rea 
for an assault. According to Sachs LJ in Lamb: 
 
The undisputed facts in evidence were that [L] possessed a Smith & Wesson revolver, 
with a five-chambered cylinder, and that each time the trigger was pulled the cylinder 
rotated clockwise; that [L], in jest and with no intention to do harm, pointed the revolver 
at [the deceased], his best friend, who was treating the incident as a joke; that the 
revolver had two bullets in the chambers, neither bullet being in the chamber opposite 
the barrel; that [L], having no intention to fire the revolver, pulled the trigger, its pulling 
rotated the cylinder and so placed a bullet opposite the barrel, the bullet was struck by 
the striking pin and [the deceased] was killed.(at p.982, emphasis added) 
 
Moƌeoǀeƌ, S͛s ĐoŶduĐt iŶ poiŶtiŶg a loaded gun at M and pulling the trigger would almost certainly 
satisfy the element of dangerousness. As was recently confirmed by Lord Thomas CJ in the Court of 
Appeal in R v F&E [ϮϬϭϱ] EWCA Cƌiŵ ϯϱϭ ;at [Ϯϭ]Ϳ, ͚[i]t has ďeeŶ estaďlished siŶĐe at least ϭ9ϰϯ that 
iŶ deteƌŵiŶiŶg ǁhetheƌ the aĐt ǁas daŶgeƌous, the test is oďjeĐtiǀe͛. HeŶĐe, the faĐt that S ďelieǀed 
the gun to be unloaded would not exonerate him. The case of R v Ball [1989] Crim LR 730, in which 
the accused shot and killed his neighbour, is instructive on this point. His defence was that he 
thought he had loaded his shotgun with a blank cartridge but had mistakenly loaded a live cartridge. 
He was nevertheless convicted of manslaughter (on the basis of an unlawful and dangerous act) and 
his conviction was upheld. Professor J.C. Smith explained the verdict in Ball in the following terms: 
 
The sober and reasonable man cannot be treated as having come on the scene at the 
moment of the fatal act with no knowledge of any earlier events. His knowledge must 
surely include awareness of the preparatory acts done by the defendant—in the present 
case his taking up a handful of cartridges from a pocket which he knew to contain both 
live ones and blanks. It was this act which made the subsequent pulling of the trigger 
dangerous and the sober and reasonable person would have recognised it as such. 
 
Applying this analysis to the facts of S, the sober and reasonable person would have awareness of 
the fact that S had inserted a magazine clip into a self-loading pistol, then removed the clip, but had 
Ŷot ĐheĐked ǁhetheƌ a ďullet ƌeŵaiŶed loaded iŶ the Đhaŵďeƌ. These aĐts ͚ŵade the suďsequent 
pulling of the trigger dangerous and the sober and reasonable person would have recognised it as 
suĐh͛. 
 
Meanwhile, it would not have been possible to convict B in Bowler via the unlawful act route, on the 
basis that there was simply no unlawful act. A similar situation occurred in R v Slingsby [1995] Crim 
LR 570. In that case, the accused (D) had met the victim (V) at a Nottingham nightclub. Back at her 
flat, D peŶetƌated V͛s ǀagiŶa aŶd ƌeĐtuŵ ǁith his haŶd. She suffeƌed Đuts Đaused ďǇ a sigŶet ƌiŶg 
worn by D, septicaemia developed and she died. D was charged with manslaughter. At the outset of 
the trial at Nottingham Crown Court, the judge was asked to make a ruling on whether D could be 
liable for manslaughteƌ. He ƌuled that V had ĐoŶseŶted to the ͚ǀigoƌous seǆual aĐtiǀitǇ͛, aŶd the faĐt 
that she suffered unforeseen (indeed unforeseeable) injuries did not convert their consensual sexual 
aĐtiǀitǇ iŶto a Đƌiŵe. He ĐoŶĐluded that ͚[i]t ǁould ďe ĐoŶtƌaƌǇ to pƌiŶĐiple to tƌeat as ĐƌiŵiŶal 
activity which would not otherwise amount to assault merely because in the course of the activity an 
iŶjuƌǇ oĐĐuƌƌed.͛ 
 
The same point was explained very clearly by Gilbart J in Bowler: 
 
A man has died needlessly, and another must face condign punishment for indulging in 
their mutual fondness for a dangerous form of seeking sexual satisfaction. But we make 
it clear right at the start that the fact that death resulted from a most unusual sexual 
practice is not an aggravating factor. Provided that what they do remains within the law, 
the sexual preferences of those outside the sexual mainstream are a matter for them 
and not for the criminal courts. The only relevance of the unusual predilections of [B] 
and W is that, if not conducted with care, they involved the creation of a very real 
source of danger. (at [16]) 
